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Sammendrag:. Hvor store totale reduksjoner i 
utslippet av klimagasser kan en forvente i en global 
klimaavtale? Innenfor spillteorien er det formulert 
potensielle svar på dette spørsmålet. Dette 
arbeidsnotatet inneholder en kritisk diskusjon av to 
(sentrale) spillmodeller som gir pessimistiske svar på 
spørsmålet. Begge modeller tar utgangspunkt i et 
uendelig gjentatt, n-person fangens dilemma spill. Den 
første modellen er en full informasjonsmodell og 
krever at likevektene må være svakt 
reforhandlingssikre. Dette leder til en (kanskje 
kontraintuitiv) konklusjon om at en avtale som kan gi 
høy nytte for gruppen, vil gi lavere totale reduksjoner 
enn tilfellet er for en avtale som kan gi lav nytte for 
gruppen. Den andre modellen forutsetter ufullkommen 
offentlig informasjon og krever at likevekten må hvile 
på terskelutløsende strategier. Hovedkonklusjonene 
(som er mer intuitive) er to: Totale reduksjoner tiltar 
med forbedret verifikasjonsteknikk, for en gitt 
spillergruppe. Men det er også slik at  totale 
reduksjoner tiltar med økende spillergruppe, for gitt 
verifikasjonsteknologi. Empiriske implikasjoner fra de 
to modellene identifiseres, og det argumenteres for at 
disse bør konfronteres med eksperimentelt genererte 
data, slik at en kan diskriminere mellom modellene på 
bakgrunn av deres prediksjonskraft.  En grunn for 
dette er at det ikke finnes historiske data på avtalte 
reduksjoner i utslipp av klimagasser, siden ingen slik 
avtale enda har trådt i kraft.   
   
Abstract: What levels of total abatement can one 
hope for in a global climate agreement? Some 
potential answers to this question are provided by 
game theory. This working paper contains a critical 
discussion of two (prominent) game models that 
answer the question quite pessimistically. Both models 
take the n-person, infinitely repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game as their point of departure. The first 
model is a full information model and utilizes the 
notion of a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium. 
This results in the (maybe counterintuitive) prediction 
that an agreement that can provide high utility to the 
group will attract less total abatement than an 
agreement that can only provide low utility to the 
group. The second model assumes imperfect public 
information and utilizes the notion of a trigger level 
equilibrium. This results in the (more intuitive) 
prediction that the level of total abatements will 
increase with improved verification techniques, for a 
given player set. Still the level of total abatements 
decrease with an increasing player set, for a given 
verification technique. Empirical implications of the 
two models are identified, and it is argued that one 
should confront these with experimentally generated 
data in order to discriminate between the models. One 
reason for this is that historical data on abatement 
efforts in a global climate agreement do not exist since 
no such agreement has entered into force yet.  
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1 Introduction 
How much cooperation can one reasonably expect from an interstate agreement to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere? Can one hope to increase the amount of 
such cooperation through mindful design of the agreement?  If so, which design principle is 
best suited to enhance cooperation? Finding plausible answers to such questions is clearly an 
important endeavour. One common and influential way of seeking insight is to employ the 
tools of game theory, a stylized theory of strategic interaction between consciously goal 
seeking actors.  
This chapter contains a critical discussion of some of the answers provided by two game 
theoretic models that figure prominently in the literature on global warming. Both models 
produce pessimistic predictions. To some extent the design principles implied seem 
counterintuitive. Furthermore, the predictions are largely untested against data. For this 
reason the predictions and design proposals should be viewed as preliminary, but highly 
interesting, hypotheses. In line with common norms of scientific practise, we ought to require 
that predictions stand their ground in empirical confrontations before regarding them as valid 
explanations, giving rise to attractive design proposals. In the last part of the chapter, some 
thoughts on how we may design suitable empirical tests of the predictions are presented.  
1.1  The framework, and two repeated game models  
Incentive problems relating to the decentralized provision of collective goods are frequently 
analyzed as games of strategic interaction between ‘players’ having ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
payoffs. A collective good is a good that every player benefits from once it is provided, no 
matter whether the player contributed to the provision of the good or not. Since the costs of 
provision are borne by individual players, and since the benefit of a single provision is taken 
to be marginal, a free rider incentive is created. Every player prefers that the other players 
provide the good and that they can abstain from costly contributions altogether.  
Reduced emissions of greenhouse gases are commonly viewed as the epitome of a 
collective good. Reducing the probability of adverse consequences in the future require 
individual states to undertake costly emission reductions. The state system is truly 
decentralized, due to the principle of sovereignty. Any emission reductions undertaken locally 
will lessen the probability of adverse consequences on a global scale because of the way 
greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere. Even though a particular set of reductions may have 
distributive effects, with the best of contemporary knowledge these remain fundamentally 
uncertain.1 The problem is therefore commonly simplified by assuming that the benefits of a 
particular reduction in the probability of adverse consequences are spread equally among the 
states. This simplification is used in the following discussion.  
The maximal reduction that any single state is able to undertake is assumed to have a fairly 
small impact on total global warming. Since emission reductions are costly, each state faces a 
free rider incentive. A similar incentive faces any signatory that happens to have entered into 
a costly climate agreement. In this case the behavioural expression is non-compliance with 
agreed upon (and costly) emission reductions. Such incentives are magnified to the extent that 
unilateral emission reductions reduce the competitiveness of the state in world markets.  
A stylized example of the strategic incentives facing a single state in a situation like this is 
provided in figure 1. The horizontal axis gives the number of other states contributing to the 
1On this it is interesting to compare the accurate prophecy on the knowledge situation 10 years ahead 
found in Schelling 1992:2-3, with the statements of the knowledge situation found in UNEP2001.  
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provision of the good, n. The maximal number of other contributors is N-1. The vertical axis 
gives the payoffs for the state in question, say state I,  as a function of n. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that each state has a binary choice: either to contribute a given amount 
to the provision of the good, or abstain from contributions all together.2 The function Gi(n) 
give the payoffs of abstaining while the function Fi(n) give the payoffs of contributing, both 
as functions of the number of other contributors. The parameter c designates the individual 
cost of a contribution.  A prisoner’s dilemma – like that in figure 1 – is characterised by two 
relationships. First, for any number of contributors, it is always best for each player to abstain 
from contributions (Gi(n)>Fi(n) for all n and for any i ∈{1,..,N}). Second, universal 
cooperation is preferred to universal non-cooperation by any player (Fi(N)>Gi(0) for any 
player i ∈{1,..,N}). The dilemma consists in the following. Abstaining is a dominant strategy 
for any player – that is, a strategy that every rational player would choose since it is a best 
response no matter what the other players choose. At the same time the resulting equilibrium 
is inefficient in the Pareto sense; that is, every player prefers the (non-equilibrium) outcome 
where they all contribute, to the (equilibrium) outcome where no player contributes. At least 
such conclusions hold if the game is played a finite number of periods under conditions of full 
information.3  
In other words, the prediction of the finitely repeated game is that even in a situation where 
every signatory to a climate agreement prefers all signatories to honour their obligations and 
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases rather than cheat on their obligations by non-
compliance, no signatory will heed its obligation. Foreseeing this, no rational party will want 
to enter a climate agreement in the first place. The pessimistic behavioural prediction of the 
finite horizon game is indicated by the black disc in figure 1.  
If the interaction is modelled as an ‘infinitely’ repeated game, the behavioural predictions 
can be less gloomy than in the case where the game is played a finite (and known) number of 
periods. By ‘infinitely’ we understand that the interaction has a constant periodic probability 
of continuing for yet another period, where the periods are taken to be of equal length. 
Specifically, if the exact length of the repeated game is unknown in this sense, and the states 
are patient, it cannot be rule out that some provision of the good will be an equilibrium 
outcome. Arguably, an ‘open horizon’ game is more plausible as far as global warming goes. 
A ‘last period’ in the global warming game is really only conceivable insofar as major 
breakthroughs in clean technologies can be envisioned (examples that spring to mind are 
fission energy and hydrogen engines). It is of course difficult, or even impossible, to predict a 
precise arrival date for such breakthroughs. The model-notion of a constant continuation 
probability may seem passable as an analytical substitute for the possibility of a technological 
breakthrough.  
In what follows, attention is limited to the open horizon game. How much provision one 
may expect in such a game varies with the details of the model. The first model we consider is 
from Barrett (1999). Barrett’s model leads to particularly distressing predictions. Specifically 
it predicts that in a given group of rational states, (1) only climate agreements of little value to 
the group will be implemented by the full group of states, and (2) climate agreements of some 
                                                     
2This assumption is captured in the figure by letting the distance between states on the horizontal axis 
be equal.   
3The reason for this goes as follows. In a finitely repeated game, non-compliance must be a dominant 
strategy in the ultimate stage game. After the ultimate stage game there is now a future in which one 
may be punished for non-cooperation. Knowing this, players in the penultimate stage game will realise 
that non-compliance is a dominant strategy here also. This logic carries over all the way to the first 
stage game in the finitely repeated game, and is commonly referred to as the unravelling problem.   
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value to the group will only be implemented by a small number of the states, rendering such 
cooperation of little value to the full group of states.  
 
Ui( . ) Gi(n )
Fi(n )
0
0 1 2 … N -1 n
-c
 
 
Figure 1. A prisoner’s dilemma game 
 
For instance, Barrett argues that the achievements of the Montreal agreement on ozone 
depletion could carry a large number of signatories partly because it achieved little more than 
a modernization of technology, which would have been modernized in any case. In this sense 
the agreement was of little value to the group of signatories, and the group of signatories 
could be large. In spite of this, the agreement had to be bolstered by side payments and trade 
restrictions.  
In the global warming case, abatement costs are far from negligible. Accordingly, one 
might expect to see few signatories to an agreement on global warming. Alternatively, if the 
number of signatories eventually turns out to be substantial, one would expect the terms 
agreed upon to render the agreement virtually valueless to the signatories. If we choose to tell 
the history of the Bonn meeting through Barrett’s perspective, two features stand out: The US 
decided not to become a signatory, and the terms of the Bonn agreement were substantially 
watered down by allowing sinks to count toward meeting reductions targets (see Torvanger 
2001 for details).     
In my view, a counterintuitive implication of Barrett’s model is that it is possible to make 
an agreement easier to comply with by rendering it less efficient (or otherwise more costly). 
In this way, participation in an agreement on global warming may be broadened by making it 
less attractive.  
Of course, in Barrett’s model cost and benefits are givens: The researcher is allowed to 
manipulate with such entities in order to obtain comparative statics. Players, however, are not 
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allowed to choose costs or benefits. In reality, however, parties must coordinate their beliefs 
on the terms of a treaty (by negotiation or otherwise) before the question of signing it or not 
has any meaning. There are many ways in which costs and benefits can be, and are, 
manipulated. It suffices to mention the choice of instruments of implementation (for instance 
uniform emission reductions or taxes on emission); the question of whether trade in quotas 
should be allowed, and if so how such a market ought to be designed; and the question of 
whether credits for sinks should be allowed or not.  
In my opinion this is precisely why Barrett’s comparative static results are interesting. 
Thus, we should pay careful attention to the prediction that parties can coordinate on a less 
efficient treaty in order to enlarge the group of signatories. To me this facet of the model is 
contrary to the usual intuition of economists, namely that more efficient agreements will 
facilitate compliance.  
Like any model, Barrett’s model rests on a number of restrictive assumptions. Section 2.3 
contains a critical discussion of the model assumptions, the robustness of the model 
predictions and their (lack of) intuitive appeal.  
In section 3.1 another variant of the open horizon game is presented, namely that of Green 
and Porter (1984). It deviates from the one discussed in section 2 in that states have imperfect 
public information: This means that no state can observe another’s actions directly, but that 
every state can observe a  random variable that may change for two reasons: (1)  (Non-) 
compliance with the climate agreement. (2) Natural fluctuations not due to (non-) compliance. 
The probability distribution over fluctuations is taken to be commonly known.4 This model 
was originally formulated to analyze cartel agreements in economics. Since uncertainty about 
natural fluctuations is endemic in the global warming question, such a model formulation may 
seem promising. Section 3.2 discusses the model’s applicability to climate agreements. In 
particular, the question of what kinds of random variables lend themselves to the type of 
monitoring envisaged in the Green-Porter model is addressed. In Barrett’s model, monitoring 
and verification can (of course) have no place, since information is assumed to be (almost) 
perfect and complete (for convenience we refer to this as ‘a full information environment’).5  
The Green-Porter model shares a prediction with Barrett’s model, namely that less 
cooperation is more likely in a large group of signatories than in a small group. The reasons 
given for this, however, are quite different in the two models. In the Green-Porter model, 
states cooperate if the state-variable does not exceed an agreed upon level. The marginal 
impact of non-compliance on the random variable, however, is smaller the larger the group, 
so the incentives to comply are weakened in a large group. In Barrett’s 1999 model, less 
cooperation can be expected in a large group because the particular collective rationality 
requirement imposed forbids it. At the same time it is noted that if one imposes the same kind 
of collective rationality in the Green-Porter model, cooperation also decreases in this model.6  
In the Green-Porter model, verification may play a role because the environment is not one 
of full information. And interestingly, it turns out that more cooperation can be extracted by 
reducing the spread of the random-variable in this model or by improving verification 
4 ‘Commonly known’ meaning that every player knows it, knows that every player knows it, that every 
player know that every other player knows it, and so on.  
5 Perfect information means that the players have no uncertainty as to where in the game they are when 
they take actions.  In the game at hand the information is almost perfect since players do not know each 
others choice of actions when actions are taken in the present period, but they do know the actions 
taken in all subsequent periods. Complete information means that there is no uncertainty (of any order) 
as far as the other players ‘types’ are concerned. Types refer to payoff-relevant characteristics of the 
players, such as utility over outcomes and beliefs about the relevant parameters of the game.   
6 See van Damme (1989), Kong-Pin (1995).  
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techniques. Thus, the model singles out verification and monitoring as variables that the 
design of a climate agreement ought to focus on. This is elaborated on in section 3.3.7  
According to the standard view on methodology, model predictions should be evaluated by 
confrontations with real world data. Unfortunately, but for obvious reasons, no data on 
(non)compliance with a global climate agreement exists. In section 4 the possibility of testing 
competing predictions of the two models in a laboratory setting is discussed. Sketches for the 
design of such experiments are provided, and references to central results from existing 
experiments on decentralized provision of public goods are noted. Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes the chapter.  
2 Compliance with full information  
Provided that the parties are patient enough (if the discount factor is high enough), almost any 
conceivable pattern of behaviour may be constructed as a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the 
open horizon game.  
In a sub-game perfect equilibrium no party has any incentive to deviate unilaterally from 
the prescribed behaviour in any sub game, on or off the equilibrium path of the play. In the 
infinite horizon game each period constitutes a separate sub game. Consider as an example an 
equilibrium in which every player plays the famous ‘grim trigger’ strategy. First, this strategy 
tells a player to comply with the terms of the agreement, as long as no player has deviated 
from those terms (on the equilibrium path). Second, the ‘grim trigger’ tells a player never to 
comply with the agreement again if any deviation from the agreed upon terms is ever 
observed (off the equilibrium path).  It can be shown that even fairly impatient players may 
establish a threat structure that ensures universal compliance, if they all abide by the grim 
trigger.  
If every player sticks to «grim trigger» each will obtain a discounted payoff of 
)1/()( δ−nFi . A single deviation by player i will net him a payoff of G  in the sub 
game when he deviates. Thereafter he will get a discounted payoff of 
)1( −ni
1/()0( )δδ −iG , since 
the agreement is suspended for ever by every player after a deviation has been observed. Thus 
if )1/()0()1()1/()( δδδ −+−≥ ii GnG−i nF  it does not pay to deviate from the agreed 
upon terms. Without loss of generality we may normalize 0)0( =iG (as in figure 1). Now it 
is easily seen that a single deviation does not pay the player if [ ] δ≤− )1(/)( nGn i−− )1( FnG ii . If the condition is fulfilled, grim trigger is a best reply on 
the equilibrium path.  
It is also easy to see that no player can gain by not carrying out the proscribed punishment 
(of suspending the agreement for ever) once a deviation has been observed. Given that every 
other player carries out the punishments proscribed by grim trigger, player i will get a 
periodic payoff of  if he too carry out the punishment. If player i continue to fulfil 
his obligations he will get a periodic payoff of 
0)0( =iG
0)0( <iF  (by definition of the prisoners 
dilemma game). It is therefore in a players interest to carry out the equilibrium threat if called 
upon to do so. The threat is therefore said to be credible, and grim trigger is accordingly a 
best reply off the equilibrium path.  
                                                     
7 This discussion relates to the model presented in chapter 7 of the book.   
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A simple numerical example may clarify. Consider a situation where the agreement is 
worth one unit of utility for each additional player that complies, and where the cost of 
compliance is two units of utility. In an agreement where 101 players play the «grim trigger», 
unilateral deviations does not pay off as long as [ ] δ≤=−− 100/1100/)21*101()1*100( . 
A discount factor of 1/100 means that postponing the benefits of reduced emission for one 
period, is worth only 1/100 of having these benefits right away. Such a discount factor can 
hardly be said to characterize particularly patient players. The numerical example thus 
illustrates that even very impatient players may (in theory) establish a treat structure that 
ensures unanimous compliance to the agreed upon emission reductions as sub game perfect 
equilibrium. 
If the discount factor is high, milder threats than a grim trigger will insure that no player 
has any incentive to deviate unilaterally. Such threats may take more or less peculiar forms, 
for instance a threat to postpone the agreement for t<∞ number of periods; a threat to never 
comply in odd numbered periods ever again; a threat to suspend the agreement for t number 
of periods followed by compliance for t’ number of periods, x number of times after a 
deviation, and so on. This phenomenon is referred to as ‘the folk theorem’. It renders the 
model without empirical cutting power, since any conceivable pattern of behaviour can be 
constructed as a sub-game perfect equilibrium.    
2.1 Barrett’s model 
Barrett refers to a sub-game perfect equilibrium as individually rational. A few years ago an 
agreement that rested on such an equilibrium was commonly referred to as a self-enforcing 
agreement because no party has an individual incentive to deviate unilaterally from the 
specified terms (on or off the equilibrium path) as long as the agreement rests on strategies 
that constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium.  
Still, there is something unsatisfactory in equating the term ‘self enforcing’ with the 
behaviour dictated by a strategy like ‘grim trigger’. Once play is brought off the equilibrium 
path by a single deviation, it is in every player’s interest that they all – collectively – abandon 
their punishments and restart cooperation. Knowing this, a player will understand that if he 
deviates, claims that the deviation was a one-of-a-kind incident never to be repeated, and 
proposes that the deviation be pardoned, then rational players will pardon, since if they 
collectively do so they will each increase their individual payoff. But then every player will 
want to deviate and be pardoned in every period, the logic of the threat structure unravels, and 
it seems curious to refer to the agreement as ‘self-enforcing’.  
To be truly self-enforcing Barrett demands that an agreement should not only be 
individually rational (in the sense of sub-game perfect), but also collectively rational,  in the 
sense that the players cannot profit individually by deviating collectively from the equilibrium 
threats of punishing transgressions of the terms. The strategy Barrett considers is a close 
relative of the famous ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, namely ‘getting even’. While tit-for-tat is not sub-
game perfect, getting even is. Like tit-for-tat, getting even uses a far milder threat of 
punishments than does the grim trigger. Getting even says that a player contributes unless he 
has contributed more frequently than any other player in previous rounds. If he has 
contributed more frequently in previous rounds, he gets even by not contributing while the 
others contribute. In this sense getting even matches the punishment to the harm done.  
To see what collective rationality means in the infinite horizon game we utilize some 
simple notation. Following Barrett we close the model by letting the payoff functions be 
linear in the number of other players cooperating. More precisely we let  
and , where c is the cost of contributing. As before, we normalize G  
without loss of generality. It is easily shown that the strategy vector where every player 
cnfnF −⋅=)(
0)0( =ngnG ⋅=)(
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follows ‘getting even’ is a sub-game perfect equilibrium, provided c  (see 
Barrett 1999:531 for the details). That this strategy vector is sub-game perfect, however, is 
not hot news, considering the above-mentioned folk theorem.  
0>≥> fg
nfcg ≥+ /)
n≥1/
We therefore turn to the condition for the strategy vector where all players stick to ‘getting 
even’ to be renegotiation proof. Assuming discount factors arbitrarily close to one, the 
condition is not difficult to get a grip on. If a player deviates, each of the other signatories will 
net a payoff of  in that period. In the period immediately following the 
deviation, the deviating player (in accordance with the dictums of ‘getting even’) pays 
penance by being the sole provider of the good. This nets each of the other players . 
Carrying out the threat dictated by ‘getting even’ thus nets each of the punishing players a 
total of . If the non-deviating players collectively decide to forget the 
single deviation (in contradiction with the dictums of ‘getting even’), their payoffs will be 
. Thus, it is not individually profitable to forget collectively if 
cnf −−⋅ )1(
gc +−− )1
cnf −⋅+
nfg
)1(⋅g
nf ⋅ (
c−− )1
c
nf ⋅ (
nf cnfc −⋅+−)−⋅≥+ 1(−− )1⋅ ( , or in other words if ( .  
It is this last condition that give rise to the central - and in my opinion counterintuitive - 
predictions of Barrett’s model: first, that a valuable climate agreement can only be self-
enforcing for a small number of signatories; and second, that a climate agreement which is 
valuable for the signatories can only be self-enforcing if the number of signatories to the 
agreement is small.  
For the sake of building intuition, consider the same numerical example as above. Let each 
contribution from the other players increase a players benefit with one unit of utility, while 
the cost of contribution is two units of utility for every player. Using Barrett’s condition we 
find that an agreement will be self enforcing if, and only if, + )21( .  
In words: if the number of signatories to the climate agreement is less than or equal to three 
it will be self enforcing, otherwise not. The potential number of signatories in the example 
was 101. So; if we want to be sure that the 101 players affected are able and willing to heed 
their obligations to reduce emissions of green house gases, only three of them should become 
signatories to the climate agreement, given the benefits and costs of the example. The 
remaining 98 states should be allowed to free ride, so as to assure that the agreement is self 
enforcing.  
If we wish to include more signatories to a self enforcing climate agreement, however, we 
may do so. But this comes at a price. For instance we may make it more costly for the states 
to abate. This can be achieved in a number of ways. One way is to prohibit such measures that 
economists usually want to build climate agreements on, like efficient emission taxation, 
markets for tradable emission quotas, and joint implementation mechanism. For instance, by 
rising the cost to five units of utility the agreement can carry six signatories and still be self 
enforcing; and by rising the cost to 100 units of utility even the full group of 101 states can be 
signatories to a self enforcing climate agreement.   
2.2 Relevance  
Barrett’s model rests on a number of restrictive assumptions. Among them are the following:  
(i) All countries are identical.  
(ii) Interaction takes place under (almost) perfect and complete information. 
(iii) Cooperation exhibits constant or increasing returns (since Gi(n) is assumed to 
increase at a slower rate than Fi(n)).   
(iv) A uniform emission quota is the only instrument available.  
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(v) Abatement levels from previous periods are observed noiselessly at the beginning 
of every period, and without costs. 
(vi) Punishments can be carried out with full force immediately after observing 
abatement levels. 
(vii) Only internal threats (strategies of reciprocity) are considered (the only sanction 
allowed is reacting to non-compliance by reducing one’s own abatement efforts). 
(viii)  Cost functions are independent (which, for instance, means that interaction 
effects via world markets are not taken into account).  
(ix) Choice of abatement levels are binary (either socially efficient or no abatement)  
 
Barrett’s pessimistic predictions may consequently be unwarranted: Relaxing one or more 
of the above assumptions may after all result in more optimistic conclusions. What then, do 
we know about the robustness of the model conclusions to relaxations in the assumptions? 
The answer seems to be ‘not a lot’. To the best of my knowledge the only assumption relaxed 
is (iv). This is done by Finus (2001:274-279) and by Finus and Rundshagen (1998), which 
allow for endogenous choice between uniform emission reduction quotas and uniform 
emission taxes. The conclusions arrived at do not differ qualitatively from the ones reached in 
Barrett’s 1999 model. So in this respect Barrett’s model seems robust.  
Models of climate cooperation building on quasi-dynamic processes of conjectural 
adaptation have been forwarded (Barrett 1994, Bauer 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 
1992,1993, Hoel 1992, cf.  Finus and Rundshagen 1998:146-7, Finus 2001 and Wagner 
2001:378-88 for discussions). In such models, actions are not taken in real time. Rather the 
dynamics are thought of as a cognitive process taking place in the minds of the players. 
Actions are taken once and only once, and such models should therefore be viewed as 
essentially static. Consequently the equilibria of such models may deviate from the equilibria 
in a truly dynamic model, so ‘the adjustment process itself may not be an equilibrium of the 
repeated game where players know that they face each other repeatedly’ (Fudenberg and 
Tirole 1991:26). In addition to this, players’ beliefs are given exogenously by their reaction 
functions in the quasi-dynamic models. This may in turn lead players to entertain updated 
beliefs that are not rational in the usual sense of the word (that is, their beliefs may not follow 
from the use of Bayes’ rule where this is possible).8  
Bearing these serious limitations in mind, we may nonetheless note that if collective 
rationality is imposed, the conjectural adaptation models tends to lead to the same pessimistic 
conclusion as Barrett’s 1999 model does. Furthermore, some of the above assumptions have 
been relaxed in the static models, without producing qualitatively more optimistic 
conclusions.9 Specifically, the pessimistic conclusions holds when (i) is relaxed and countries 
are allowed to differ in size or in payoff functions; when (iii) is relaxed and cooperation is 
allowed to exhibit decreasing returns; when (vii) is relaxed and issue linkage is allowed (for 
instance by way of trade sanctions, or more generally by way of ‘side payments’).10  
8See Rasmusen (1994:312-13 ) for an elaboration on this point. See also Finus and Rundshagen 
(1998:146-47), who argue that quasi dynamic models are unrealistic in a specific sense.   
9The adaptive thought experiment ends in a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding simultaneous move 
game.  Examples of such thought experiments are found in Cournout and Stackleberg’s convergence.  
10A good overview of the results obtained within the framework of static models is given by Finus 
2001:219-57.   
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2.3  Discussion  
As noted, Barrett’s 1999 model rests on a number of highly restrictive assumptions, which 
makes the resemblance between it and real climate negotiations fairly vague. Little is known 
about how robust the predicted difficulties in establishing and maintaining an ambitious 
climate agreement are with respect to relaxations in such assumptions. What we ‘know’ about 
this stems from models that do not properly take time into account.  Such ‘knowledge’ should 
be handled with care, since it is fundamental to social life that actions are actually taken in 
real time (not by abstract contemplation).  
Given the set of assumptions, Barrett’s model results in (what I find to be) counterintuitive 
conclusions. Being counterintuitive, we must wonder whether real people placed in an 
environment mimicking the one in the model will actually behave as predicted. On this point, 
laboratory experiments may turn out to provide guidance. If carefully constructed laboratory 
experiments fail to support the model implications, we may suspect that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with Barrett’s model. That would be less trivial – and far more 
interesting - than merely pointing out that his model (like all models) rests on a set of 
restrictive assumptions: For even a model resting on blatantly restrictive assumptions may 
well provide the perfect stepping stone to more refined hypotheses at a later stage.  
In my view, two assumptions stand out as potentially being ‘fundamentally wrong’. First, 
in open-horizon games the concept of collective rationality is ambiguous even in the two 
player case. Several definitions of renegotiation proof equilibria have been forwarded for this 
class of games, but the different definitions do not necessarily lead to the same behavioural 
predictions (cf. the discussion in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991:179-182). Except for Barrett’s 
own work, attempts to clarify what collective rationality means in infinite horizon games with 
more than two players are lacking. Barrett uses one particular definition of collective 
rationality (based on Farell and Maskin 1989) in his 1999 paper, but does not discuss 
alternative definitions.  
In a more recent paper, however, (Barrett 2002) strengthens the notion of collective 
rationality. This turns out to support additional cooperation in a larger group of signatories. 
Qualitatively, however, the implications resemble the ones of the 1999 paper – particularly 
‘[f]or any given problem an SCR [strongly collectively rational] treaty is unique and typically 
incomplete; some countries cooperate and some free ride’ (2002:3).  Though the modification 
of the collective rationality concept is interesting, it will not be dealt further with here.   
Second, we should note that there is a deep distributional conflict between signatories and 
non-signatories in Barrett’s model. Barrett’s model provides no guidance as to the selection 
between the equilibria the model gives rise to. We may suspect that the way we model this 
selection process can have a profound impact on the conclusions we are able to draw about 
the kind of climate agreements that will be entered into and complied with. In any situation 
involving real people - for instance in controlled experiments - this selection problem is very 
real, and will have to be solved. Also on this point more work on the models is needed for us 
to form firm conjectures.  
To see this second point more clearly, we continue the numerical example from above. 
There are 101 potential signatories but only 3 signatories are allowed in the self enforcing 
agreement. Thus the 3 signatories each obtain a net periodic payoff of 
123*1 =−=−⋅ cnf
33*1 ==⋅ ng
 while the corresponding payoff for each of the 98 non signatories is 
. Every player evidently prefers to become a non-signatory. With 101 
players, however, there exists (by the binomial coefficient) 166 650 ways to form a group of 3 
actual signatories. Or in other words; we encounter an overwhelming number of renegotiation 
proof equilibria, and they all give rise to deep distributional conflicts. 
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3 Compliance with imperfect public information  
All this aside, the most unsatisfactory assumption made by Barrett may well be that 
information is (almost) perfect and complete. A full information environment is a particularly 
restrictive assumption to make in almost any applied work in the social sciences. As far as 
applications to the management of global climate problems goes, the restrictiveness of the 
assumption is particularly glaring. Uncertainty as to almost every thinkable aspect of the 
climate problem is highlighted in a qualified majority of applied work. In the history of game 
theory, moreover, we find many examples showing us that results may change in profound 
and interesting ways if we change our assumptions about the information structure of a 
particular game. In what follows one such a relaxation is discussed. It seems particularly 
relevant to the climate problem.  
3.1 The Green-Porter model 
The Green-Porter model takes as its departure the open horizon, N-person prisoner’s dilemma 
game. What is new is that information is assumed to be ‘publicly imperfect’. This is taken to 
mean that no player can observe the actions of any other players directly. However, each 
player can observe the same random variable, and this variable is related both to the actions 
taken in the game and to a random process unrelated to the actions of the players.   
Some notation might be useful to clarify the idea. Let ‘the quality of the atmospheric 
environment’ at the end of period t be measured by an index given by the following 
expression ∑ == Ni titt cQ 1 ,θ . We take tθ  to be a random variable, which is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed over time. This random variable captures ‘natural 
fluctuations’ in ‘the quality of the environment.’ The term c  is taken to be the abatement 
cost incurred by state i in period t. This cost is (for simplicity) assumed to be linearly related 
to improvements in ‘the quality of the atmospheric environment’, and the relationship may 
(without loss of generality) be assumed to have a unit slope. The incurred cost is a choice 
variable, and captures ‘man-made fluctuations’ in ‘the quality of the environment’. What a 
player can observe is his own incurred abatement cost and the quality index. No player can 
observe the abatement cost incurred by any other player, or the realization of the random 
variable. Some further intuition is given by the following numerical example. 
ti ,
Let the range of tθ  be 0 to 1 inclusive. Furthermore, let the climate agreement contain 101 
homogenous signatories, each of which has undertaken an obligation to make abatement 
efforts worth one cost unit each period. Non-compliance by signatory i in period t is taken to 
mean that no abatement costs was incurred by player i in period t ( )0, =tic .  
Suppose that the realized value of the random variable in period t was 1, and 50 states 
complied with the terms of the agreement in that period, the quality index becomes 50. The 
quality index also becomes 50 if the random variable realizes the value .5 and 100 states 
complied, or if all 101 states complied and the random variable realized the value 50/101, and 
so on. Thus, observing only the quality index and his own incurred abatement cost does not 
allow a player to draw firm conclusions about compliance. The reason is the intervention of 
“natural fluctuations” that create noise.   
What then are the terms one can expect the players to comply with under such conditions? 
Green and Porter have shown that there exist equilibria in so-called trigger-level strategies. In 
a trigger-level strategy a player i complies as long as the random variable Q is kept at or 
above a constant threshold-value 
t
Q . If the random variable falls below that threshold-value 
in a period t, player i ceases to comply in the k consecutive periods following t, independent 
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of the value that the random variable might take in these k periods. In period t + k +1, player i 
complies again. He thereafter complies in every period until the random variable falls below 
the threshold value again. From the period following immediately thereafter, he then repeats 
the same non-compliance pattern (with identical k).   
In equilibrium the full group of players (N) play identical trigger-level strategies (same Q , 
same k). A challenge is that there may (and most often will) exist more than a single pair of 
‘punishment phases’ and threshold-levels (Q  and k) that constitutes an equilibrium. Thus, we 
encounter a selection problem. A reasonable solution to this problem is to assume that players 
will coordinate on an agreement with a pair k and Q  such that individual payoffs are 
maximized in equilibrium. Since players are treated symmetrically in equilibrium there is no 
distributive conflict, and this pair also maximizes aggregate payoffs under an equilibrium 
constraint. For this reason the selection criteria constitute a kind of collective rationality 
constraint, albeit very different from renegotiation-proofness.  
A fascinating aspect of the equilibrium in trigger-level strategies is that no player ever 
cheats (this follows directly from the formulation of the equilibrium strategies). Periods of 
non-compliance are always triggered by natural fluctuations in equilibrium.  If ‘punishments’ 
are removed (k=0) altogether, every player will have an incentive to cheat, and trigger-level 
equilibria with abatement levels higher than the dominant abatement level of the one-shot 
game do not exist.    
What can be said about the trade off between the length of the punishment phase and the 
ambition of the threshold level? If we let the individual abatement efforts - ci,t - vary (which is 
possible within the Green-Porter framework) the answer is intuitive. Decreasing Q  and/or 
decreasing k allows the abatement level to increase in equilibrium. This is so since both kinds 
of changes decrease the ‘expected punishments’. Decreasing Q  makes it less likely that the 
threshold falls short of actual quality, thus reducing the frequency of punishment phases. This 
is illustrated in figure 2 for a uniform distribution of tθ  on the interval [0,1].  
 
P(Q)
Q=0 Q1=1/3 Q2=2/3 Q=1  
 
Figure 2. Probability of the environment having a particular quality 
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In figure 2, the probability of realizing an environmental quality at least as good as the 
threshold level of 1Q  (in any given period) is given by the area of the distribution to the right 
of . This probability can be seen to be 1-(1/3)=2/3. Setting a more ambitious threshold-
level at 
1Q
2Q , the probability of realizing a quality as least as good as the threshold-level 
corresponds to the area right of . This probability is 1-(2/3)=1/3. And in general, the more 
ambitious the threshold-level is, the smaller the probability that it will be achieved.  
2Q
Decreasing k reduces the length of a punishment phase. In the efficient equilibrium (the one 
that maximizes individual payoffs) the pair ( Q , k) is selected in order to balance the cost of 
‘expected punishments’ with the need to deter non-compliance.  
For any equilibrium level of abatement efforts  (*,tjc ij ≠ ), it is possible for player i to 
calculate the probability that the actual quality falls short of the threshold-value if he chooses 
a non-equilibrium abatement level . This is so since the distribution of tic , tθ  (but not its 
realizations) is common knowledge. The probability of a specific realization of the quality is 
then  
( )titjtt ccNQP ,*,)1()( +−=θ  
The expression is clearly increasing in N: the number of players that the public good is 
defined upon, or less stringent, the number players that (for exogenous reasons) are expected 
to contribute to the provision of the good. So, for a given threshold-value, the probability that 
non-compliance will trigger a ‘punishment phase’ decreases with the number of players the 
good is defined upon (N). This is so since the marginal impact of a deviation on  
decreases with N, and thereby weakens the incentive to comply.  
)(QPt
In a large group therefore, the efficient agreement must be less ambitious as far as 
environmental quality goes, or must stipulate longer phases of non-compliance after failing to 
attain the threshold value of environmental quality.  It may be interesting to note in passing 
that a large group of countries were defined out of the hard-core obligations stipulated in the 
early in the Kyoto process (the Annex B countries).    
Another interesting insight can be drawn from the expression above. Reducing the spread 
of the distribution tθ  will decrease the probability that a realization of a specific 
environmental quality falls below an ambitious threshold value because of natural 
fluctuations. Or in other words, reducing the spread of tθ  is the model expression of 
improved verification techniques, and such improvement allows for more ambitious 
agreements in equilibrium.  
 
3.2 Relevance  
Even though the Green-Porter model shares many restrictive assumptions with Barrett’s 
model - notably assumptions (i), (iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) and (viii) in section 2.2 - it nonetheless 
relaxes the assumptions of complete information, instantly observable abatement levels and 
binary choice of abatement levels. So, in terms of realism one is inclined to say that a lot has 
been gained.  
Note that the Green-Porter model has a size effect that relates to the one in Barrett’s model.  
There are important differences, however. In Barrett’s 1999 model the size effect is unrelated 
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to the potential group of signatories (N).11 Low abatement levels are due to the restrictions 
placed on the number of actual signatories to an agreement by an ambiguous notion of 
collective rationality, which in turn is determined by the cost and benefit functions. This 
notion leads to counterintuitive conclusions. In the Green-Porter model the size effect relates 
to the size of the group of signatories, which is determined exogenously to the model. The last 
of these facets should, of course, be seen as a weakness.  
Barrett’s model determines only the umber of signatories to a self-enforcing climate 
agreement. The model is silent as far as the identity of the signatories goes. This is a 
weakness since it is profitable to not become a signatory, and since the selection problem 
must find its solution in any real world situation, be it in the laboratory or elsewhere. In the 
Green-Porter model there is no similar selection problem to be solved, although there is an 
equilibrium selection problem. This selection problem is, however, solved in a fairly 
uncontroversial way, by using a correspondence between individual and collective rationality.  
3.3 Discussion  
First and foremost the Green-Porter model seems attractive in that it produces predictions that 
- at least for me - are more intuitive. This is especially so on three points. In an environment 
with imperfect public information, cooperative efforts to provide collective goods may fail 
even though no party intentionally cheats. This is due to suspicion. Lowering the 
‘punishments’ for failure to reach an environmental goal may extract higher abatement efforts 
in periods where the players abate, but will lead to less ambitious environmental goals and/or 
longer periods where emissions are uncurbed. This is due to a balance of expected cost and 
benefits. Finally, improved verification extracts more abatement.  
This last aspect of the model is especially interesting with respect to the model for 
monitoring concentrations of greenhouse gases described in chapter 7 of the book. 
‘Environmental quality’ is far from being a clear cut concept. If by natural fluctuations we for 
instance mean ‘variations in mid temperature on the earth’, the Green-Porter model seems 
uninteresting because of assumption (v) in section 2.2: The time lag from emissions to 
changes in mid temperature is very long and uncertain. Linking ‘environmental quality’ 
directly to emissions seems much more promising. Basing verification solely on information 
provided by the signatories, however, is risky because of incentives and opportunities to 
misrepresent. A monitoring system like the one outlined in chapter 7 of the book avoids both 
the lags and the misrepresentation problems, and fits nicely into what insights there are to be 
drawn from the Green-Porter model. This monitoring system attempts to allow verification by 
monitoring the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.   
Again the most interesting evaluation of the model would likely be controlled laboratory 
tests of its central implications. There may even be some room for running tests of competing 
hypotheses in the Green-Porter and the Barrett model. I say more about this in the next 
section.  
4 Strategies for empirical evaluation 
As noted, no field data exist that can be used to evaluate different predictions about 
compliance with and verification of obligations undertaken by states in a global climate 
agreement. This is so simply because the agreement has not yet entered into force.  
Lack of field data, however, does not preclude any kind of meaningful confrontation of 
game theoretic predictions in this field. It is possible to generate data in carefully designed 
11In Barrett’s 2002 paper, a link between N and equilibrium behaviour is identified.   
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laboratory settings. Experimental methods - like any method - have their strengths as well as 
their weaknesses (see the introduction to Kinder & Palfrey 1993 for good discussion).12 
Considering the strengths, even in situations where field data exist, it may well be worth the 
effort to ‘triangulate’ methodologically by supplementing analyses of field data with analyses 
of experimentally generated data. 
In what follows a number of testable hypotheses derived from Barrett’s model, as well as 
from the Green-Porter model, are sketched. They are partly overlapping, and partly 
competing. In my judgement they all lend themselves to experimental evaluation, but I have 
little to say here about the detailed design of such evaluations. That remains a task for the 
future.  
In an environment of the kind described by Barrett, one should expect that: 
H1: Increasing the cost (c) of cooperation increases cooperation (increases the number of 
subjects willing to enter into the agreement and fulfil their obligations) 
H2:  Increasing the marginal gain of cooperation (f) reduces cooperation (reduces the 
number of subjects willing to enter into the agreement and fulfil their obligations) 
H3:  Increasing the marginal gain of defection (g) increases cooperation (increases the 
number of subjects willing to enter into the agreement and fulfil their obligations) 
H4: All of the above effects are amplified by allowing cheap talk between rounds.13  
H5: None of the above is dependent on the size of the potential group of signatories (the 
total number of subjects in the experiment) for given parameter values.   
 
In an environment of the kind described by Green and Porter one should expect that:  
H6:  Subjects select threshold-values and lengths of punishment phases close to the 
efficient equilibrium when both parameters are free. 
H7:  Subjects increase (decrease) their threshold-values when the length of the punishment 
phase is reduced (increased) from the efficient equilibrium.  
H8: Subjects increase (reduce) the length of the punishment phase when the threshold-
value is reduced (increased) exogenously from the efficient equilibrium.  
H9: Subjects cooperate in more (fewer) periods when the spread of the probability 
distribution over natural fluctuations is reduced (increased).  
H10: Cooperation decreases (in the sense of being seen in fewer periods) when the total 
number of subjects in the experiment is increased. 
 
12 Effective control and increased possibility of isolating the often particularistic relationships 
postulated by game theory are among the main advantages. The ability to ‘create’ un-observables like 
preferences and beliefs are also among the strengths. Prominently figuring among the weaknesses is the 
nagging question relating to the generalizability of results from the stylized laboratory settings (with 
weak financial incentives and unique attention to the problem at hand) to settings outside of the 
laboratory.  
13Barrett (1999) stresses that  cheap talk (especially by diplomats) between rounds facilitates the kind 
of collective rationality constraint (weakly renegotiation proof equilibria, WRPE) that he uses to arrive 
at his model conclusions. In this Barrett is in disagreement with van Damme 1989:207, note 1 (who 
considers WRPE in two player games): ‘[explicit communication]  is irrelevant: Even if no player can 
articulate the proposal, the logic underlying the argument should convince both players not to punish 
each other (and themselves)’. Thus it is not obvious that H4 follows from Barrett’s model.  
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As I have already made clear, I find H1, H2, and H3 to be particularly counterintuitive. In 
contrast to this I find H6, H7 and H8 more in line with intuition. In my view it would be 
particularly interesting to evaluate H9, considering the scientific model outlined in chapter 8 
of the book.  
H5 cannot be said to be counterintuitive, but it is rather unconventional considered as a 
formulation of the size principle (cf. Olson 1965). H10, on the other hand, deals with the total 
group of individuals that the good in question is defined upon, and is in this sense closer to 
Olson. However, since Olson makes a static argument, less cooperation means lower 
contributions per capita in a particular round. Lower sum contributions per capita over several 
rounds seems like an acceptable generalization to a dynamic environment. Both hypotheses 
are, however, interesting formulations of a size principle. It is especially interesting to note 
that previous experiments have found  that per capita contributions increase with increasing 
group size (total number of participating subjects), controlled for the marginal productivity of 
a contribution (see the fascinating design and results in Isaak et al. 1984). Since H5 and H10 
are clearly competing, and since previous research seems to cast doubt on H10, experimental 
evaluation of these two hypotheses may potentially add to our understanding of group 
interactions in public goods provision.   
5 Conclusions  
We now return to our central question, is the number of parties to an agreement a case of the 
‘more the merrier’? Repeated game models arguably provide us with well founded and 
precise potential answers – or conjectures – to this question. The two models discussed here 
answer in the negative. In this they stand firmly in a long and solid tradition, running back (at 
least) to Mancur Olson (1965).   
It is interesting to note that Olson’s size principle (i.e., the probability of some amount of 
collective good being provided is larger in smaller groups) does not show up in carefully 
designed experimental tests (Ledyard 1995, Palfrey 1993, Dawes et al. 1993, Isaak et al 
1993). We may legitimately wonder if alternative formulations of the size principle, like the 
ones encountered in Barrett’s model or the Green Porter model, will fare better in controlled 
laboratory tests.  
In my opinion it is desirable, and maybe even necessary, to correct our theory building 
efforts in this field by data confrontations. Until we have done so, it is hard to say whether 
more is merrier, or not. Since the question is a very important one, I end with a plea for model 
testing.  
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